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In contemporary culture, soldiers held as prisoners-of-war (POWs) or as hostages
are considered at significant risk of mental illness, in particular post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). This assumption contrasts with the psychiatric orthodoxy
of the First World War when it was concluded in both Britain and Germany that
POWs were protected against ‘war neurosis’. Although ‘barbed wire disease’ was
identified during time of captivity, post-release effects were not recognized. The
repatriation of ‘protected’ POWs in 1943 prompted a reassessment of the
psychological impact of imprisonment when servicemen of previous good
character began to behave aberrantly. Rehabilitation programmes were designed
to enable soldiers to re-adapt to service or civilian roles. Difficulties of adjustment
were cast in social and cognitive terms, and corrective measures were occupa-
tional and educational. Psychiatric disorders found in POWs were explained in
terms of a pre-conflict predisposition to, or a history of, mental illness. However,
retrospective studies of veteran POWs have found a high prevalence of PTSD. A
change in attitudes is explored in relation to the advance of medical terminology
into the territory of emotions and the attribution of pathological processes to
self-recovering mental states. The reclassification of the effects of imprisonment
implies that diagnoses in military psychiatry are culturally determined and can
be understood only if they are placed in a context that includes changing beliefs
about mental illness, the formal development of the psychiatric profession and
the immediate needs of the armed forces.
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Retrospective studies of veterans who had been prisoners-of-war
(POWs) during the Second World War established a link between
captivity and mental illness, in particular post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). For example, an investigation conducted in 1989 found that
eighteen (29 per cent) of a sample of sixty-two US veterans who had
been POWs during the Second World War met the criteria for PTSD
and, based on their recall of symptoms, 50 per cent would have
qualified for the diagnosis in 1946, a year after their repatriation.1
Furthermore, an investigation conducted in 1997 of 262 US veterans
who had been held captive during the Second World War or the Korean
conflict showed that 53 per cent had suffered from PTSD in the past,
while 29 per cent still had symptoms of the disorder.2 These results led
the study’s authors to conclude that PTSD was a ‘persistent, normative
and primary response’ to the severe trauma of captivity.3
This modern perspective stands in marked contrast to the First
World War when captivity, it was believed, protected against mental
illness. Indeed, British and French servicemen taken prisoner and held in
German camps were the subject of a psychiatric conference held at
Munich in September 1916. The discussants overwhelmingly agreed that
POWs were immune from ‘war neuroses’ such as shell-shock. However,
the release of ‘protected’ British POWs in 1943 forced the authorities to
reassess this orthodoxy. Aberrant behaviour in servicemen of previously
good character led both doctors and commanders to question their
understanding of the mentality of captives. To test the effects of captivity,
the newly formed Directorate of Army Psychiatry (DAP) set up a
controlled study of repatriated POWs. Military psychiatrists identified
what they characterized as an adjustment disorder, a psychological form
of ‘caisson disease’, which required a programme of ‘re-education’ rather
than formal psychological treatment. Although their findings influenced
policy and management in the immediate post-war period, it was not
until the 1980s and the recognition of PTSD that POWs were considered
at inherent risk of psychiatric disorder.
This article explores fundamental shifts in attitudes towards the
psychological effects of captivity in wartime and explores the factors
that underpinned change. We also ask what these judgements about
human vulnerability tell us about the validity of psychiatric diagnoses
and their changing popularity.
1 N. Speed, B. Engdahl, J. Schwartz and R. Eberly, ‘Posttraumatic stress disorder as a
consequence of the POWexperience’, Journal of Nervous andMental Disease, 177 (1989), 147–53.
2 B. Engdahl, T.N. Dikel, R. Eberly and A. Blank, ‘Posttraumatic stress disorder in a
community group of former prisoners of war: a normative response to severe trauma’,
American Journal of Psychiatry, 154 (1997), 1576–81.
3 Engdahl, ‘Posttraumatic stress disorder’, 1580.
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A link between captivity and mental illness in the armed forces had
been established in the late Victorian period and was reflected in the
term ‘doolally’, a popular term for madness. In 1861, the British Army
had set up a base and sanatorium at Deolali, Maharashtra, about 100
miles north-east of Mumbai. It served as a transit camp for soldiers who
had finished their tours of duty (‘time-expired’) and were waiting for
a passage to Britain. Troopships left Mumbai between November
and March, so a soldier who completed his tour outside those dates
often had a long wait for transport. Confined to a restricted life in camp
during the hot summer months, some soldiers broke down and
behaved bizarrely; they were described as having the ‘doolally tap’.4
However, these observations were not generalized beyond India
perhaps because the cause of mental illness was seen as extreme heat
(‘a touch of the sun’) rather than enforced restrictions on movement
and activity.5
During the First World War, POWs became the focus of an important
debate about the nature and causation of ‘neurosis’. In 1915, leading
German psychiatrists observed a discontinuity in symptoms reported
by soldiers engaged in combat and those held in captivity. Karl
Bonhoeffer recalled that
the difference in behaviour between the Germans who came directly
from the line of fire into the hospital station and the French prisoners
was striking. Among the Germans the familiar forms of hysterical
reactions could be found with great frequency, while among the
French, who had come from the same front circumstances [Verdun]
no trace of hysteria was to be seen.6
Furthermore, Fritz Mohr, based in Koblenz, claimed not to have found a
single case of neurosis among 12,000 British and French POWs, while
Karl Wilmanns documented only five examples among a population of
80,000 POWs.7 Hermann Oppenheim, a psychiatrist who believed that
traumatic neurosis had an organic basis in a brain lesion, questioned
the accuracy of these observations. Yet, having examined large numbers
of POWs himself, Oppenheim was forced to concede that the symptoms
of psychological disorder appeared to be absent.8
4 Frank Richards, Old-Soldier Sahib (London, 1936), 73–4.
5 Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to
the Gulf War (Hove, 2005), 6.
6 Quoted from Paul Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of Trauma in
Germany, 1890–1930 (Ithaca, 2003), 68.
7 Paul Lerner, ‘From traumatic neurosis to male hysteria’, in Mark Micale and Paul
Lerner (eds), Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870–1930
(Cambridge, 2001), 158.
8 Lerner, Hysterical Men, 69.
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Similarly, British army doctors who treated captured German troops
rarely found evidence of traumatic neuroses. Captain Harold Wiltshire,
a physician who had served in France and Salonika,9 concluded
that infantry soldiers welcomed a diagnosis of shell-shock because it
secured a period of hospitalization away from danger. By contrast, the
POW, who found himself in a place of safety, had no need of such
symptoms.10 The view that a wound or captivity protected against
neurosis was widely held by military doctors.11 So well were these
beliefs founded that they persisted into the Second World War. The 1943
edition of Henderson and Gillespie’s Text-book of Psychiatry declared
‘among prisoners of war psychoneuroses are rare’.12 During the
Normandy campaign, Brigadier E. Bulmer, consulting physician to 21
Army Group, examined large numbers of captured, wounded and sick
soldiers and was ‘struck with apparently few cases of psychoneurosis
among German POWs’.13
The fact that British doctors were unable to find symptoms of
neurosis in German POWs and German psychiatrists found no evidence
of shell-shock in British POWs, in part, related to the conventions of
war. Captured soldiers considered themselves combatants and duty
bound to escape. To have admitted psychological symptoms, such as
depression, anxiety, repeated fears or troubling dreams, would have
been tantamount to surrender and an acknowledgement of low morale.
Yet, the conclusions drawn by psychiatrists during the First World
War are contradicted by evidence from war pension files. After the
Armistice, large numbers of British veterans who had been POWs
were granted financial compensation and their medical records
revealed the existence of psychological symptoms. Indeed, doctors
examining repatriated veterans at post-war boards often diagnosed
them as suffering from neurasthenia or disordered action of the heart
(DAH),14 illnesses which ran counter to the hypothesis that captivity
protected against neurosis. A possible explanation is that psychological
symptoms recorded in war pension files arose after the 1916 Munich
Conference when conditions in German camps dramatically deterio-
rated. The Allied naval blockade progressively cut the import of
9 H. Willoughby Lyle, ‘Harold Waterlow Wiltshire’, Lancet, 1 (1937), 295.
10 Harold Wiltshire, ‘A contribution to the etiology of shell-shock’, Lancet, 1 (1916),
207–12.
11 T.A. Ross, Lectures on War Neuroses (London, 1941), 64.
12 D.K. Henderson and R.D. Gillespie, A Text-book of Psychiatry for Students and
Practitioners (Oxford, 1943), 531.
13 The National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew (hereinafter TNA: PRO), WO177/
316, E. Bulmer, Quarterly report of consulting physician, 21 Army Group, 1 Jul to 30 Sep
1944.
14 E. Jones, R Hodgins Vermaas, H. McCartney, B. Everitt, C. Beech, D. Poynter, I.
Palmer, K. Hyams and S. Wessely, ‘Post-combat syndromes from the Boer War to the Gulf:
a cluster analysis of their nature and attribution’, British Medical Journal, 324 (2002), 321–4.
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foodstuffs to Germany. By the winter of 1917–18, growing numbers of
British POWs with suffering from starvation, not to mention the
influenza pandemic and other diseases.15 Official statistics recorded that
392 British officers (6.4 per cent) held in German camps and 10,856 other
ranks (7 per cent) died in captivity.16 Alternatively, symptoms reported
after 1918 may represent a delayed syndrome or delayed help-seeking, a
phenomenon identified in relation to PTSD. Millais Culpin, writing in
1920, believed that the protection offered by a wound against psycholog-
ical disorder was only temporary: ‘since we know that repressions can
light up symptoms at any time, it follows that we may expect to find the
latter developing when men have recovered from wounds’.17 Because
medical records for POWs at the time of their capture and imprisonment
rarely survive, the discrepancy between contemporary clinical judge-
ments and historical medical files cannot be easily resolved.
Barbed Wire Disease
In the aftermath of the First World War, a syndrome specific to
captivity, but distinct from shell-shock, was described. Drs R. Bing and
A.L. Vischer, who had studied British POWs interned in neutral
Switzerland, identified a form of ‘neurasthenia’ characterized by mental
exhaustion, irritability, intellectual instability, loss of concentration and
disturbance of memory.18 Adopting the term ‘barbed wire disease’, they
believed it was caused by confinement and monotony, accentuated by
‘sexual deprivation’ and lack of privacy. Vischer concluded that
the treatment of prisoners (in the stalags) has but little influence on
their mental condition. Brutal treatment does not produce the
disease, neither does good treatment prevent it. Even a beautifully
situated camp is not preventative . . .The disease is not cured by mere
release from imprisonment.19
Although Bale and Vischer observed that ‘many of the interned men
give the impression of a personality that has been profoundly
changed’,20 they conceptualized the disorder as psychoneurosis
associated with mental exhaustion.
15 M. Spoerer, ‘The mortality of Allied prisoners of war and Belgian civilian deportees
in Germany custody during the First World War: a reappraisal of the effects of forced
labour’, Population Studies: A Journal of Demography, 60 (2006), 121–36.
16 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War
(London, 1922), 329.
17 Millais Culpin, Psychnoeuroses of War and Peace (Cambridge, 1920), 37.
18 R. Bing and A.L. Vischer, ‘Some remarks on the psychology of internment, based on
the observation of prisoners of war in Switzerland’, Lancet, 1 (1919), 696–7.
19 A.L. Vischer, Barbed Wire Disease: A Psychological Study of the Prisoner of War (London,
1919), 3.
20 Bing and Vischer, ‘Some remarks’, 697.
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Nevertheless, these clinical observations had no impact on post-war
policy. UK government departments, such as the Ministries of Labour
and Pensions, made no special provision for returning POWs,21 who
were treated the same as any other veterans.22 Furthermore, the War
Office declined to assume responsibility for the rehabilitation of former
captives, a policy that incurred ‘a good deal of criticism at the time’.23
Repatriated ‘Protected’ POWs
Article three of the 1929 Geneva Convention introduced a significant
change to the international regulations governing POWs. Henceforth,
non-combatant troops, members of the medical corps or chaplains,
together with seriously sick and wounded combatants, were eligible for
exchange and repatriation. During the Second World War, evidence
provided by these regulatory changes exercised a significant impact on
thinking about the psychological effects of imprisonment. Although the
German authorities agreed to the repatriation of 1,200 British POWs in
September 1941, they cancelled the exchange when it was found that
only 150 suitable German prisoners were available for return.24 Not
until October 1943 was a transfer of 5,000 British, Commonwealth
and American repatriates arranged.25 Among these were 1,200 members
of medical units who became the focus of an influential study.
During the course of 1943, British military authorities had become
increasingly aware of problems with repatriated officers. Although
returned to duty, high rates of invalidity and disciplinary incidents in
men with excellent military records suggested that imprisonment had
adverse consequences.26 An article published in June 1943 by Captain
G.F. Collie, himself a former POW, argued that prolonged captivity
often caused ‘minor mental abnormality’. He called for schemes of
rehabilitation in the belief that three months treatment could ‘effect a
complete and lasting cure’ in ‘even the most difficult cases’.27
Furthermore, reports circulated that of ninety POWs repatriated from
21 TNA: PRO, LAB2/1518/DRA 203/29/1918, Eligibility of civilian prisoners of war,
1919.
22 G.C. Pether, ‘The returned prisoner-of-war’, Lancet, 1 (1945), 571–2.
23 TNA: PRO, ADM1/18875, Sir P.J. Grigg, ‘Rehabilitation of returned prisoners of
war’, 22 Aug 1944.
24 S.P. MacKenzie, The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War in Nazi
Germany (Oxford, 2004), 176, 244,
25 Adrian Gilbert, POW: Allied Prisoners in Europe, 1939–1945 (London, 2006), 225.
26 R.H. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War (London,
1958), 227.
27 G.F. Collie, ‘Returned prisoners of war: a suggested scheme for rehabilitation’, The
Fortnightly, 153 (1943), 407–11.
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Italy, a third had become ‘sufficiently abnormal to warrant some action
being taken’.28 If these anecdotal accounts served as a harbinger of
what might happen when the entire POW population was released,
then the authorities faced a considerable problem.
In the knowledge that there were at least 98,000 British POWs
in German hands and a further 45,000 held by the Japanese,29 the
authorities convened a meeting in September 1943 chaired by Lt
General Sir Alexander Hood, Director General Army Medical Services.
Significantly, they met in the London offices of the DAP, a fledgling
organization seeking to justify its role. Brigadier J.R. Rees, consulting
psychiatrist, argued that the ninety repatriates were a sample ‘too
small on which to base any valid conclusions, and that there was no
literature or statistics on this problem from the last war’.30 Yet he
speculated that the problem might be more serious than it appeared.
Because the ninety repatriates were RAMC personnel who had been
employed in nursing duties during their imprisonment, soldiers from
other units who had not had the benefit of purposeful activity ‘might
show even greater signs of abnormal reaction upon return home’.
Whilst all agreed that ‘a scheme of rehabilitation was required’, no one
could say what form it should take. Thus, an opportunity was created
for the DAP to define the nature of the problem and propose remedial
measures.
Crookham Rehabilitation Study
To discover more about the mentality of repatriated POWs and to test
the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes, the DAP devised a
practical experiment at No. 1 RAMC Depot, Boyce Barracks, Crookham,
near Aldershot. It ran between November 1943 and February 1944 and
involved 1,154 recently repatriated servicemen, either RAMC personnel
(61 per cent) or stretcher bearers from other units (39 per cent). Possibly
because of stigma, no officers were included in the study, which
comprised: 17 warrant officers (1.5 per cent), 185 NCOs (16 per cent)
and 952 privates (82.5 per cent). Most subjects were experienced
soldiers or volunteers: regulars (25 per cent), reservists (14 per cent) or
territorials (35 per cent); only 27 per cent were conscripts. The majority
28 TNA: PRO, WO32/11125, Rehabilitation of repatriated prisoners of war, meeting
held at 39 Hyde Park Gate, 16 Sep 1943, 1.
29 TNA: PRO, WO32/11125, Memorandum, British ex-Prisoners of War, Rehabilitation
of those returning to civil life, 16 Aug 1944, 1.
30 TNA: PRO, WO32/11125, Rehabilitation of repatriated prisoners of war, meeting
held at 39 Hyde Park Gate, 16 Sep 1943, 2.
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(85 per cent) had been imprisoned for at least three years in Germany
as a result of capture in France, Greece or Crete.31
Questionnaires and interviews revealed what was termed a ‘stalag
mentality’ in POWs who had been held captive for more than eighteen
months: ‘a very real but unfounded feeling that their physical or mental
health has been somewhat damaged’. These beliefs were supported by
‘depression and guilt’ suffered whilst a prisoner and by ‘the anxieties of
re-adaption’.32 To address these issues, a six-week residential course of
education, vocational training, entertainment and games was designed.
A medical officer, Captain J.C.B. Nesfield, screened the sample for
physical illness, while Lt Colonel A.T.M. Wilson, a psychiatrist recruited
from the Tavistock Clinic, reported on their mental state. Although 60
per cent had ‘minor psychological disturbances’, only sixteen (1.4 per
cent) were referred for out-patient treatment and eight servicemen (0.7
per cent) were sufficiently ill to require psychiatric admission. To assess
morale and general health, rates of sickness and absenteeism amongst
POWs were compared with 1,311 controls (depot staff, transfers and
RAMC recruits). Repatriated prisoners were found to be more likely to
go absent without leave or report sick than RAMC controls.33
These results were interpreted as a sign of low morale among the
POWs. On admission, soldiers appeared ‘cheerful’ at having regained
their freedom, though ‘a reaction set in’ when it dawned on them that
the war was far from over and they remained eligible for active service.
Colonel D.C. Scott, the Crookham depot commandant, reported that
‘there is little doubt that some of the repatriated men are inclined to be
difficult and appear out of their depth, but . . . this is not such a big
problem as the psychiatrists fear it will be’.34 His military opinion was
supported by the medical officer who described the repatriated pris-
oners as a ‘fit and robust group’.35 Only twenty ‘frankly neurotic’ cases
were referred to Hollymoor Military (Psychiatric) Hospital, Northfield,
for further treatment.36 Thus, Nesfield could conclude that ‘the majority
of men were perfectly normal’.
31 TNA: PRO, ADM1/18875, The Crookham Experimental Rehabilitation Scheme, Feb
1944.
32 TNA: PRO, WO165/129, Directorate of Army Psychiatry, Technical Memorandum
No. 13, ‘The Prisoner of War Comes Home’, May 1944, 12.
33 TNA: PRO, WO32/10950, A.T.M. Wilson, ‘Report to the War Office’, Feb 1944,
graphs of sickness and absenteeism.
34 TNA: PRO, WO32/10950, Colonel D.C. Scott, Report on the Repatriation of Protected
Personnel ex-Germany, Oct 1943, 6.
35 TNA: PRO, WO32/10950, Captain J.C.B. Nesfield, Some observations of the
protected personnel recently repatriated to the country, 7 Feb 1944, 1.
36 Tom Harrison, Bion, Rickman, Foulkes and the Northfield Experiments: Advancing on a
Different Front (London, 2000), 192.
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Major P.H. Newman, a surgeon and himself a former POW, likened the
after-effects of captivity to a psychological form of ‘caisson disease’; that
is, serious physiological effects caused by insufficient time to adjust to a
rapid fall in atmospheric pressure.37 Problems of adaption, Newman
believed, manifested themselves in restlessness, irritability, disrespect
for authority and irresponsibility. However, he considered that these
symptoms would resolve themselves and confidently predicted that in
the ‘great majority’ of cases a ‘prisoner-of-war mentality’ should ‘pass
off after six months to one year, and thus those affected should give rise
to no concern’.38 Lt Colonel Chapel, a medical officer who had also
suffered imprisonment, argued that ‘repatriates suffered from an
inevitable depression after several months at home, and complete
readjustment is not a short-term process’.39 Time to adapt was crucial in
the view of Lt Colonel Wilson who wrote that ‘men who return to civil
employment too soon tend to break down in three to four weeks’.40
By the end of 1944, the problems experienced by repatriated POWs
were conceptualized as an inability to cope with the changes that had
taken place during their captivity.41 In the absence of husbands and
fathers, and offered wider employment opportunities, women had
taken on greater responsibilities. A civil liaison officer attached to a
POW rehabilitation centre observed that the ‘independence’ shown by
wives and daughters, their ‘increased use of make up, smoking and
drinking . . . came as a great shock, and, together with the fact that many
women were earning more than a man’s pre-war wage, were felt to
constitute a threat to their manhood and aroused a fear that their place
in the family was no longer necessary’.42 Indeed, a common trigger for
breakdown among POWs was ‘marital disharmony’ caused by fear of,
or actual, infidelity combined with feelings of guilt, inferiority and
inadequacy.43
Ironically, the dissonance between the POW and UK society had
been accentuated by propaganda designed to reassure the families of
captured servicemen. ‘The general impression’, wrote one repatriated
37 P.H. Newman, ‘The prisoner-of-war mentality: its effect after repatriation’, British
Medical Journal, 1 (1944), 8–10; see also Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and
Psychiatrists 1914–1994 (London, 2000), 316–8.
38 Newman, ‘The prisoner-of-war mentality’, 9.
39 TNA: PRO, WO32/11125, Repatriation of Canadian prisoners of war, 1 Jul 1944, 9.
40 TNA: PRO, WO32/11125, 2, Meeting on 17 Feb 1945 to discuss certain medical
aspects of the rehabilitation of repatriated prisoners of war.
41 TNA: PRO, LAB12/352, Minutes of a meeting with regional controllers Ministry of
Labour and National Service, 10 May 1945.
42 M.G. Bavin, ‘A contribution towards the understanding of the repatriated prisoner of
war’, British Journal of Psychiatric Social Work, 1 (1947), 29–35, 32.
43 A. Torrie, ‘The return of Odysseus, the problem of marital infidelity for the
repatriate’, British Medical Journal, 2 (1945), 192–93.
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POW, ‘is that the prisoners are being fairly well looked after and are in
some respects lucky to be out of the war’.44 The December 1943 edition
of The Prisoner of War, a magazine given to next of kin, contained
photographs of British POWs skiing, taking part in games and eating a
hearty meal in a ‘friendly atmosphere’.45 This confirmed popular beliefs
that captives were on full army rations.46 Hence, many POWs returned
home to find that their family and friends had little idea of the
hardships they had endured. In time, the authorities recognized that
it was ‘necessary to pay as much attention to the education and
preparation of the home community as it was to the returning service
men’.47
The length of time that servicemen had been imprisoned, together
with the social changes created by the wartime economy, left them
strangers in their own land.48 The sense of being lost or passed by was
characterized as a ‘psychological disability . . . of a particular kind’. In
addition, captivity was thought to have eroded adaptive capacities
‘since all the men are expected to have suffered in some degree from
the mental strain of prison camp life’.49 Furthermore, a coping
mechanism commonly adopted during imprisonment was the con-
struction of an idyllic picture of home life to serve as ‘a source of
comfort and hope’.50 Although this vision maintained morale in
captivity, it served to heighten the contrast with reality when the POW
returned to his family.
Policy and Operational Responses
The Crookham study did not prompt an immediate policy change.
There may, perhaps, have been a suspicion that army psychiatrists were
exaggerating adverse effects of captivity to increase their influence or
that medical corps personnel lacked the robustness of combat soldiers.
However, evidence continued to mount, suggesting that formal
rehabilitation programmes were needed. At a tri-service conference
held at the Ministry of Pensions on 20 June 1944, Major General J.F.
Hare reported that 30 per cent of repatriated POWs in the most recent
44 TNA: PRO, WO32/11125, 33c, Letter, unsigned, c.1944.
45 The Prisoner of War, 2, 20 Dec 1943), 12.
46 Evelyn Waugh, Officers and Gentlemen (London, 1955), 26–7.
47 TNA: PRO, FO1013/177, A.T.M. Wilson, ‘Some problems of repatriation and
resettlement of German prisoners of war’, Sep 1947, 13.
48 T.F. Main, ‘Clinical problems of repatriates’, Journal of Mental Science, 93 (1947),
354–63.
49 TNA: PRO, WO32/11125, Minutes of a meeting held on 13 Oct 1944 to discuss
experimental rehabilitation unit for prisoners of war.
50 Wilson, ‘Some problems’, 6.
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exchange were ‘difficult cases’.51 Despite the growing recognition
that captivity ‘caused a severe psychological shock’,52 the meeting
concluded that the needs of POWs were not significantly different from
those of ‘the general body of ex-servicemen’. Consequently, POWs
continued to be managed through ‘the normal machinery set up to
deal with the problems of the ex-service community as a whole’
and ‘psychiatric rehabilitation’ offered only to the small numbers of
‘neurosis cases’ that arose.
However, this conservative approach met official opposition. In
August 1944, convinced by evidence from an experimental rehabilita-
tion centre set up by the Ministry of Labour, the Secretary of State for
War, Sir P.J. Grigg, instructed service chiefs to design a specific
programme of training and resettlement for POWs. Introduced to
address the gap between their pre- and post-captivity experiences, a
programme of rehabilitation sought to facilitate social and cognitive
readjustment through ‘lectures, films discussions and so on, designed
mainly to bring the ex-prisoner-of-war up to date with current affairs
and problems, together with an element of physical rehabilitation by
games, physical training etc’.53
Further impetus for a formal policy response was provided by the
return of escaped POWs, servicemen who had demonstrated
resourcefulness and determination. Following the end of hostilities
with Italy in September 1943, a number of POWs had been released,
evading recapture for up to a year while finding their way back to
British lines. A study of forty escapees who had been referred to an
army ‘neurosis centre’ concluded that chronic anxiety and aggression
inhibited re-adaption to service life.54 However, the trauma of captivity
was considered merely a trigger of these symptoms and heredity
identified as the root cause because 55 per cent of the group were found
to have a family history of neurosis or severe mental illness.
In summer 1945, the government unveiled a national rehabilitation
programme. Re-education and employment were the focus of the
twenty ‘Civil Resettlement Units’ (CRUs) set up by the War Office,55
while the Royal Air Force (RAF) opened a number of ‘Resettlement
Training Centres’. Brigadier H.A. Sandiford, director of army psychi-
atry, believed that ‘resocialisation’ was the aim and that ‘finding a
51 TNA: PRO, AIR49/388, Record of a conference held at the Ministry of Pensions on
20 Jun 1944 to discuss the rehabilitation and resettlement of repatriated prisoners-of-war.
52 B. Markowski, ‘Some experiences of a medical prisoner of war’, British Medical
Journal, 2 (1945), 361.
53 TNA: PRO, ADM1/18875, Sir P.J. Grigg, ‘Rehabilitation of returned prisoners of
war’, 22 Aug 1944.
54 M. Jeffrey and E.F.G. Bradford, ‘Neurosis in escaped prisoners of war’, British Journal
of Medical Psychology, 20 (1946), 422–35.
55 Shephard, War of Nerves, 317.
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suitable job’ was both the most important therapy and outcome.56 The
CRU’s function was defined as ‘a primary training unit for civil life’,
which was to be achieved by encouraging ‘a feeling of individual
responsibility, which is self-supporting, by removing army discipline’.57
CRUs opened in summer 1945 and continued to function until autumn
1946.58 With accommodation for 250 ex-POWs, attendance was
voluntary in the case of the army but, in view of smaller numbers,
was compulsory in the RAF. A CRU course took a month but could be
extended. It included factory visits and social activities to bring the
former POW into contact with ‘institutions, individuals and situations
towards which he was often burdened with feelings of mistrust and
suspicion’.59 Weekend leave was designed to bridge the gap between
army and home life. The intention of providing each unit with a
resident psychiatrist was not met due to staff shortages. In the event
53,000 (31 per cent) former POWs held in Europe attended.60
By contrast, the Royal Navy made no particular provision for
returned POWs. Like army and air force personnel, repatriated sailors
were granted immediate leave to visit their families, and after a period
of not less than twenty-eight days were required to attend a medical
board. Although the Royal Navy recognized that POWs were in ‘a
brittle frame of mind . . . easily irritated and disturbed’,61 non-medical
cases were not regarded as a special group.62 Repatriated sailors with
psychiatric disorders were treated according to ‘existing machinery’
and sent to specialist units such as the Royal Navy Auxiliary Hospital,
Cholmondeley Castle.63 The reluctance of the navy to open rehabili-
tation units may have been influenced by a report from Surgeon Lt
Commander P.H. Tooley, a psychiatrist attached to a boat maintenance
depot. Although he recognized the value of purposeful work in
reducing defaulters, Tooley argued that programmes of employment
alone were not sufficient to rehabilitate POWs and suggested that
specialist vocational units were needed.64 By comparison with the army
and air force, the navy had relatively few POWs and probably
56 TNA: PRO, WO32/11125, 1, Brigadier H.A. Sandiford, Minutes of meeting, 27 Sep
1944.
57 TNA: PRO, LAB12/352, 1, War Office, Technical policy for resettlement, 20 Feb 1946.
58 TNA: PRO, LAB12/352, Captain G.C. Grant, Civil Resettlement HQ, Memo.
59 A. Curle, ‘Transitional communities and social re-connection, part I’, Human
Relations, 1 (1947), 42–68, 64.
60 TNA: PRO, LAB12/352, Minutes of a conference on Civil Resettlement, 5 Oct 1945, 2.
61 TNA: PRO, ADM1/18875, H.K. Oram, Memorandum, 17 Jun 1944.
62 TNA: PRO, ADM1/18875, Medical Director General of the Navy, Memo, 16 Jun 1944.
63 TNA: PRO, ADM1/18875, J.S. Lang, Memo to Commodores RN Barracks, 1 May
1945.
64 TNA: PRO, ADM1/18875, Surgeon Lt Commander P.H. Tooley, Rehabilitation of
prisoners of war, 6 Feb 1945, 2.
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concluded that the cost of setting up dedicated centres outweighed
any gain, given that they had been given the pick of recruits, that is,
individuals considered at low risk of long-term psychological disorder.
Outcomes
Little attempt was made to evaluate the efficacy of CRUs. A sole study
of an army CRU in Oxford by Major Adam Curle and Lt Colonel Eric
Trist found that of fifty men who had attended, 26 per cent showed
signs of ‘unsettlement’ (defined as apathy, restlessness, hostility and
extreme dependency) compared with 64 per cent in the 100 cases who
had not attended.65 However, the small sample size and the fact that
they had all been selected from a single location, undermine the
validity of their findings. The authors themselves conceded that the
social integration observed in the ‘settled’ cases could not be attributed
solely to a CRU programme because attendance was voluntary. Former
POWs with a poor prognosis were plausibly less likely to volunteer,
while attendance may have acted as a screen for the least traumatized
or those with better coping skills.
Follow-up studies were not conducted, in part, because the default
position was one of resilience. According to psychiatric orthodoxy,
servicemen were considered adaptable unless something (such as
heredity, family upbringing or prolonged captivity) disrupted an
inherent recovery process. Indeed, both clinicians and POWs them-
selves argued that the experience of captivity could promote positive
psychological development. Bevin, a psychiatric social worker, observed
that the prisoner of war camp was
Where many men gained an unwonted maturity of outlook . . . a new
tolerance was developed and a surprisingly deep insight into their
own and other human problems, so that potentially they are most
valuable members of the community.66
The character-building theme was explored by T.H. Hawes, himself a
repatriated POW, who argued not only that adjustment was straight-
forward (‘the process of settling into civilian life was very simple—
POWs themselves were amazed that they could settle down so easily’),
but also that his experience was a positive one: the POW ‘is much
wiser, more considerate, self-reliant, and normal than he was before
being captured’.67 Furthermore, a US Army doctor imprisoned by the
65 A. Curle and E. Trist, ‘Transitional communities and social reconnection, part II’,
Human Relations, 1 (1947), 240–88.
66 Bavin, ‘A contribution towards the understanding of the repatriated prisoner of
war’, 29–35, 35.
67 T.H. Hawes, ‘The returned prisoner of war’, Lancet, 1 (1945), 643.
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Japanese believed that captivity had ‘changed him from a tense,
ambitious individual’ to one with less inhibitions and a ‘more mature’
outlook.68 However, psychological survival during captivity was
thought to be aided by productive work, which gave medics and
chaplains an advantage as they, unlike infantry soldiers, could continue
to practise their profession.
The notion that the POW experience could lead to greater maturity
and personality development endured beyond the Second World War.
A five-year follow up study of US servicemen who had been
imprisoned during the Korean War found that 21 per cent reported
having got some personal gain from their captivity.69 In addition, a
controlled study of 221 repatriated POWs from the Vietnam War
identified a subgroup (32 per cent) who believed that their character
had been enhanced by the experience of captivity.70 They were
correlated with those veterans who had suffered the most severe
treatment, though their subjective interpretation did not equate with
observed psychiatric morbidity.
Psychological Disorders in POWs
Although the majority of repatriated British POWs were not considered
in need of psychiatric treatment, a minority were referred to military
hospitals where their symptoms were conceptualized as a form of
‘release syndrome’. Between January and May 1944, Major W.H. Whiles
investigated 100 consecutive POW admissions to Hollymoor Military
Psychiatric Hospital, Northfield. Common symptoms included irrita-
bility, apathy, difficulty in making social contacts, poor concentra-
tion, preoccupation and resentment.71 However, ‘previous personality
factors’ were identified as a root cause: 50 per cent of cases had a
‘neurotic family history’, 60 per cent had shown ‘pronounced neurotic
traits in childhood’ and 25 per cent had suffered an earlier breakdown.
Supported by the evidence of doctors who had themselves been in
captivity,72 this became an orthodox view in the immediate post-war
period.
68 S. Wolf and H.S. Ripley, ‘Reactions among Allied prisoners of war subjected to three
years of imprisonment and torture by the Japanese’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 104
(1947), 180–93, 187.
69 E.H. Schein, W.E. Cooley and M.T. Singer, A Psychological follow-up of former POWs of
the Chinese Communists: I. Results of Interview Study (Boston, 1960).
70 W.H. Sledge, J.A. Boydstun and A.J. Rabe, ‘Self-concept changes related to war
captivity’, Archives of General Psychiatry, 37 (1980), 430–43.
71 W.H. Whiles, ‘A study of neurosis among repatriated prisoners of war’, British
Medical Journal, 2 (1945), 687–98.
72 A.L. Cochrane, ‘Notes on the psychology of prisoners of war’, British Medical Journal,
1 (1946), 282–4.
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In May 1945, to supplement the CRUs, a ‘neuroses unit’ for
repatriated POWs was opened at the Southern Hospital, Dartford. Over
eleven months, under the direction of Maxwell Jones, a Maudsley
psychiatrist, it treated 1,200 servicemen released from camps in
north-west Europe.73 Occupational therapy, both in hospital workshops
and in local businesses, was the main activity, supplemented by
community groups and social events such as dances and plays.74
Although no systematic study of outcomes was conducted, Tanner and
Jones found that POWs had greater difficulty adjusting to civilian life
than other soldiers, common symptoms being fatigue, loss of energy,
anxiety and poor concentration.75
Far Eastern POWs
In June 1945, Brigadier T.F. Rodger, consultant psychiatrist to South East
Asia Command, reported that ‘British prisoners of war recovered from
Japanese hands showed fewer psychiatric symptoms and a much more
stable and satisfactory reaction to their captivity than prisoners of war
from German hands’.76 He considered this finding ‘due in large
measure to the contempt which British soldiers were able to feel for the
Japanese and the absence of any feeling that the enemy was a man of a
similar outlook and cultural background to themselves’. This surprising
judgement appeared to be supported by evidence from medical boards
held by the Ministry of Pensions. By 23 November 1945, 71,000 British
POWs from German camps had sought financial compensation and
been reviewed in contrast to only 682 from the Far East.77 Although the
number of war pensions awarded to Far Eastern prisoners-of-war
(FEPOWs) rose in the post-war period, it was estimated that less than
50 per cent made an application, suggesting that those who survived
imprisonment were a particularly resourceful and independent
population.78
73 Maxwell Jones, Social Psychiatry: A Study of Therapeutic Communities (London, 1952), 16.
74 Maxwell Jones, ‘Rehabilitation of forces neurosis patients to civilian life’, British
Medical Journal, 1 (1946), 533–35.
75 J.M. Tanner and M. Jones, ‘The psychological symptoms and the psychological
response of repatriated prisoners of war with neurosis’, Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery
and Psychiatry, 11 (1948), 61–71.
76 TNA: PRO, WO 165/129, Brigadier T.F. Rodger, 31st Meeting of Command
Psychiatrists, 2 Jun 1945, 5.
77 TNA: PRO, WO165/129, Minutes of the 34th Meeting of Command Psychiatrists, 23
Nov 1945, 4.
78 Interview of Dr Owen Eggington, former senior medical officer, Ministry of
Pensions, 29 Mar 1999.
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Nevertheless, it was soon recognized that the privations suffered by
FEPOWs were of a different order of magnitude to those experienced in
Europe.79 It is estimated that between 26 per cent and 32 per cent of UK
servicemen captured by the Japanese died,80 whereas deaths in German
camps were significantly lower at 4 per cent. The high mortality rate
among prisoners in Japanese hands was a product of forced labour,
severe dietary restrictions and tropical diseases. When organizing the
return of FEPOWs, government bodies showed some understanding of
their physical needs but were less assured in planning for psychological
contingencies. In March 1944, a committee set up by the Colonial Office
decided to open reception centres close to ports to facilitate medical
examinations and treatment for tropical illnesses.81 Almost as an
afterthought, it was noted that a few repatriates might require referral
to ‘a hospital for neurosis’.
Contemporary studies by psychiatrists supported the emphasis on
disease. In August 1945, 60,000 Europeans were released from POW
camps under Japanese control, a high proportion being admitted to
allied hospitals with illness and disease. Yet only sixty (0.1 per cent)
were referred to a specialist psychiatric unit. Cases were assessed by
Major Kirman, a British Army psychiatrist, who found that fifty were
psychotic, six neurotic and in four cases no disorder could be
identified.82 This remarkable statistic was explained in survival terms:
‘there is no biological advantage to be gained from the development of
neurotic symptoms’, a reiteration of the First World War view. In other
words, psychiatric disorders did not appear in captivity because
they served no useful purpose. However, Kirman found that fourteen
cases developed symptoms after captivity; what he termed a ‘release
reaction’: ‘a group of inadequate people who were able to overcome
their inadequacy under conditions of prison life but were unwilling or
unable to face the uncertainty of life in the outside world’.83 By
comparison, a study of thirty-five randomly selected POWs freed from
camps in Luzon found that nine (26 per cent) had symptoms of
psychoneurosis.84
79 S.P. MacKenzie, ‘The treatment of prisoners-of-war in World War II’, Journal of
Modern History, 66 (1994), 487–520, 515–6.
80 Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific (London,
1994), 360; R.P.W. Havers, Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience: The Changhi
POW Camp, Singapore, 1942–45 (London, 2003), 3.
81 TNA: PRO, CO980/168, Record of a meeting held in the Colonial Office, 9 Mar
1944, 1.
82 B.H. Kirman, ‘Mental disorder in released prisoners of war’, Journal of Mental Science,
92 (1946), 808–13.
83 Kirman, ‘Mental disorder’, 813.
84 Wolf and Ripley, ‘Reactions among Allied prisoners of war’, 180–93.
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Although no follow-up studies have been undertaken of British
veterans who had been prisoners of the Japanese, anecdotal accounts
suggest that psychological morbidity may have been masked in the
immediate aftermath of the war. Aidan MacCarthy, a RAF doctor
captured in Java and transferred to Japan, described a sense of shock
and unreality after release: ‘it was like being in a void . . .This state of
dazed trance could not continue and we gradually became aware of the
existence of another world outside the void’.85 In addition, he argued
that the intense privation and mortality of the camps were such that
‘no one could go through such experiences without losing some of
his sanity. There were some, of course, who never recovered it’.86
MacCarthy believed that the pamphlet issued by the DAP in 1944 to
prepare families to receive their repatriated relatives was counter-
productive;87 it created an impression that ex-POWs ‘were slightly
unbalanced’ and caused ‘my relations to view me with a kind of
compassionate apprehension’.88
Reframing the Psychology of Captivity
The psychological model of captivity developed during the Second
World War witnessed no fundamental change during the Korean
conflict and it was not until the later stages of the Vietnam War that US
psychiatrists proposed a different perspective. In part, they were
motivated to show that the effects of war endured well beyond the
battlefield itself, impairing the ability of ex-servicemen to function in
civilian life.89 Studies of Vietnam veterans prompted a re-evaluation of
earlier conflicts. A landmark investigation conducted in 1975 by Gilbert
W. Beebe transformed thinking about the psychological effects of
imprisonment.90 He conducted a follow-up study of a representative
sample of US Army veterans who had been POWs in the Pacific (1,020)
and in Europe (508) during the Second World War, together with 1,528
servicemen captured during the Korean conflict. Using hospital records,
Beebe found that POWs compared with controls had significantly
higher psychiatric morbidity across all three groups. He concluded that
the somatic effects of captivity were generally short term but
85 Aidan MacCarthy, A Doctor’s War (London, 1979), 139.
86 MacCarthy, Doctor’s War, 101.
87 TNA: PRO, WO165/129, Directorate of Army Psychiatry, Technical Memorandum
No. 13, ‘The Prisoner of War Comes Home’, May 1944.
88 MacCarthy, Doctor’s War, 156.
89 R.J. Ursano and D.M. Benedek, ‘Prisoners of war: long-term health outcomes’, Lancet,
362 (2003), s22–3.
90 G.W. Beebe, ‘Follow-up studies of World War II and Korean War prisoners, II.
Morbidity, disability and maladjustments’, American Journal of Epidemiology, 101 (1975),
400–22.
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‘psychologic injury’ was ‘essentially permanent’.91 No evidence was
found to support an organic brain syndrome, a form of cerebral atrophy
that some researchers had proposed following investigations of con-
centration camp survivors. Interestingly, Beebe discovered that most
former POWs had adjusted well to post-war life in terms of employ-
ment and marital relationships, though had encountered difficulties
with social and recreational activities. Based on medical records, rather
than retrospective self-report, Beebe’s findings carried weight and had
an impact on policy, such that today the Department of Veterans Affairs
offer POWs special priority in health-care enrolment.
With the formal recognition of PTSD by the American Psychiatric
Association in 1980, a number of US psychiatrists sought to re-evaluate
the long-term psychological effects of captivity on Second World War
and Korean War veterans. For example, an investigation conducted in
1986 of 188 former POWs living in Minneapolis who had been
imprisoned during the Second World War found that 67 per cent had a
lifetime prevalence of PTSD.92 However, the sample had not been
randomly selected and reports were not checked against military and
medical records. Engdahl et al. (1997) studied 262 US veterans who had
been imprisoned during the Second World War and Korean conflict.93
More than half (53 per cent) met criteria for lifetime PTSD, and 29 per
cent currently had PTSD. Of the fifty-six POWs held in Japanese camps,
84 per cent had a lifetime prevalence of PTSD and a current rate of
59 per cent. By contrast, the 191 Second World War veterans held in
Europe had a lifetime rate of 44 per cent and current rate of 19 per cent.
Yet, this was an investigation based on self-report and was not a
random sample: 334 potential subjects had been contacted and 262 (78
per cent) agreed to participate. A follow-up study of former US POWs
of the Second World War and the Korean conflict, which involved a
structured clinical interview, identified amplified rates of PTSD,
depression and generalized anxiety; indeed depressive symptoms
were three to five times higher than in the general population and
greatest in young POWs who had suffered the harshest conditions.94
US studies encouraged UK researchers to re-evaluate the long-term
effects of imprisonment on British veterans. From a broad survey of
European veterans of the Second World War, Ørner found that there
was sufficient evidence to suggest a higher level of psychiatric
91 Beebe, ‘Follow-up studies’, 418.
92 J.C. Kluznik, N. Speed, C. Van Walkenburg and R. Magraw, ‘Forty-year follow-up of
United States prisoners of war’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 143 (1986), 1443–6.
93 Engdahl et al., ‘Posttraumatic stress disorder’.
94 W.F. Page, The Health of Former Prisoners of War (Washington DC, 1992).
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morbidity than in comparable civilian controls.95 Hughes and Neil,
psychiatrists in the RAF, found that nine (30 per cent) in a group of
thirty British veterans who had been prisoners of the Japanese met the
criteria of PTSD.96 However, this was not a random sample, being
drawn from ex-service personnel attending a screen for tropical
diseases, and no controls were studied.97 Thus, most retrospective
studies, from whatever nation, relied on subjective memory for
symptoms experienced on release from captivity. With the exception
of Beebe’s research, none of the Second World War or Korean
investigations had access to servicemen’s medical records to collaborate
personal recollections.
How then can we explain the current high rates of PTSD found in
elderly former POWs and the comparative rarity of psychiatric
disorders detected in servicemen released from captivity in 1945? In
part this may reflect reporting bias introduced by contemporary culture.
In the immediate post-war period, reference to traumatic experience
was discouraged in an effort to accelerate a return to peacetime func-
tioning. Dwelling on past difficulties was viewed as counterproductive.
Indeed, a study by Lee et al. showed than many Second World War
servicemen who had experienced intense combat during the conflict
were able to establish successful careers as civilians despite continuing
to experience a range of psychological symptoms.98 By the 1990s, most
former POWs had retired. With time to reflect on their lives, anecdotal
accounts suggest that they re-experienced these traumatic events.
Combat and capture were plausibly the most intense experiences of
their adult lives and it is not surprising that wartime memories
dominated the thoughts of elderly veterans.
Conclusion
During both world wars, psychiatric orthodoxy taught that a traumatic
experience, whether as a combatant or prisoner, was a trigger rather
than an essential cause of mental illness. ‘It is not the event itself that
matters’, wrote Henderson and Gillespie in 1943, ‘but what the subject
95 R.J. Ørner, ‘Post-traumatic stress disorders and European war veterans’, British
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 31 (1992), 387–403.
96 J.C. Hughes and L.A. Neal, ‘Former prisoners who show symptoms’, British Medical
Journal, 309 (1994), 873.
97 L.A. Neal, N. Hill, J. Hughes, A. Middleton and W. Busuttil, ‘Convergent validity of
measures of PTSD in an elderly population of former prisoners of war’, International
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 10 (1994), 617–22.
98 K. Lee, G. Vaillant, W. Torrey and G. Elder, ‘A 50-year prospective study of the
psychological sequelae of World War II combat’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 152 (1995),
516–22.
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feels about it.’99 Whether or not an individual succumbed to a
psychological disorder was determined by their predisposition, family
history or repressed childhood conflict.100 Civilians were characterized
as essentially resilient,101 while military training was designed to
‘harden’ them for the rigours of combat. A stress reaction sustained by
a healthy person as a result of a life-threatening event was expected to
recover naturally with rest, akin to a self-healing wound.
In part, the attention given to POWs in the Second World War was a
reflection of the development that had taken place in psychological
medicine during the inter-war period. In the UK, departments of
academic psychiatry had been set up in medical schools and the
specialty gradually worked its way into the undergraduate curriculum.
Psychology had become a university discipline, albeit one of applied
research into aptitude and capacity, rather than clinical treatment.102
The war itself created opportunities for psychologists to demonstrate
that their techniques could serve as tools of management and selection.
Indeed, in December 1943, Brigadier H.A. Sandiford, director of army
psychiatry, wrote, ‘the time has arrived, in my opinion, when I can no
longer afford to be without the aid and advice of a consulting
psychologist’.103 In the event, Dr William Stevenson, an Oxford lecturer
attached to the Directorate of Biological Research, was appointed
consulting psychologist to the British Army with the rank of brigadier.
The creation of the DAP in April 1942 and its spread into areas of
morale, training, discipline, education and welfare could not have
happened without the professionalization of psychology in the inter-
war period. By the end of 1943, the British Army had 227 specialist or
graded psychiatrists deployed to hospitals, training establishments and
units in the field.104
However, new ideas about the psychology of imprisonment were not
simply a product of numbers and the development of clinical services.
Germany, during the First World War, had a network of high-status
psychiatric departments which served as assessment centres for psycho-
logical battle casualties.105 Their judgement that captivity conferred
immunity from mental illness was driven by a model of pathology
99 Henderson and Gillespie, Text-book of Psychiatry, 67.
100 E. Jones and S. Wessely, ‘A paradigm shift in the conceptualization of psychological
trauma in the twentieth century’, Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21 (2007), 164–75.
101 E. Jones, R. Woolven, B. Durodie´ and S. Wessely, ‘Civilian morale during World War
Two: responses to air-raids re-examined’, Social History of Medicine, 17 (2004), 463–79.
102 Mathew Thomson, ‘The psychological body’, in R. Cooter and J. Pickstone (eds),
Companion to Medicine in the Twentieth Century (London, 2000), 291–306.
103 TNA: PRO, WO165/129, H.A. Sandiford, Memo to the Director General of Army
Medical Services, 6 Dec 1943.
104 F.A.E. Crew, The Army Medical Services: Volume II—Administration (London, 1955),
469–70.
105 Lerner, Hysterical Men, 135–37.
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which emphasized heredity and notions of ‘secondary gain’. Developed
from Freud’s concept of ‘epinosic’ gain, the latter described any
advantage that a patient might secure from his symptoms, the primary
gain being a reduction in anxiety following the so-called ‘flight into
illness’.106 At first, the gain was conceived as largely monetary
(reflected in concepts of railway spine and pension neurosis where the
injured party received compensation), though in time it was elaborated
to include suppressed wishes for sympathy, attention or revenge.
Symptoms had to be the product of an unconscious process because
if they were reported as part of a carefully conceived plan, then
the patient was considered a malingerer.107 Ganser syndrome, first
described in 1898 among prisoners awaiting trial, was characterized by
approximate answers, clouding of consciousness and functional somatic
symptoms.108 The secondary gain for such individuals, it was
hypothesized, included a reduced sentence or stay of execution.
The recognition of PTSD rendered the concept of secondary gain
obsolete. By making the event rather than the person paramount, any
gains that followed became an understandable and appropriate
consequence of what was conceived as an invisible psychological
wound. However, this interpretation is controversial, not least because
it fails to explain the different patterns of psychological response
observed in the First and Second World Wars. PTSD, according to
Young, is not a universal stress reaction but a culturally driven response
to stress. ‘The disorder is not timeless’, he argued, ‘rather it is glued
together by the practices, technologies and narratives with which it is
diagnosed, studied, treated and represented.’109
This article has traced a pendulum swing in the way that the
psychological effects of imprisonment have been conceptualized. From
offering protection against mental illness during the First World War
to a cause of adjustment problems in the Second World War, today
the POW experience is closely tied to formal psychiatric disorder,
chiefly PTSD. A paradigm of resilience has given way to a paradigm of
vulnerability. If biases operate in both directions, this implies that the
psychological trauma experienced by POWs during the First and
Second World Wars may have been understated, while the resilience
and resourcefulness of those imprisoned today may also be under-
appreciated.
106 Sigmund Freud, ‘Some general remarks on hysterical attacks’, On psychopathology,
Pelican Freud library, Volume 10 (Harmondsworth, 1909), 99–100.
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1981).
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109 Allan Young, The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
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